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NOTES
Notice on the basis of this list is often an empty gesture. The filing
of a lis pendens has always been considered theoretical notice and,
in a large city, it can hardly be said to convey actual notice. Posting
a notice of foreclosure in the county courthouse and in three other
places in the borough where the affected properties are situated, is
an equally vain gesture. Finally, the statute requires the notice to
be published in three newspapers, viz., the City Record, which few
people see, the New York Law Journal, which only lawyers read,
and in any other newspaper, which may be one of dozens.70
Conclusion
The enactment of the in rem foreclosure statute marks the cul-
mination of legislative attempts to devise an efficient, rapid, and in-
expensive tax enforcement method and to deter tax delinquency. The
latter is an evil which wreaks havoc upon the financial structures of
political units which depend upon real estate taxes as their chief
source of revenue. The operation of this procedure has already dem-
onstrated its effectiveness toward achieving those ends. It is sub-
mitted, however, that since the in rem proceeding is so radical in
nature and so drastic in its effects, more stringent safeguards for the
protection of the property owner should be embodied in its provi-
sions. A genuine attempt should be made to inform the delinquent
owner of the impending foreclosure in a manner based upon reality
of notice. In addition, provision should be made for a holding by
the taxing authority, for the benefit of the parties entitled thereto, of
any extraordinary surplus resulting from the sale of the property
foreclosed.
X
CIVIL ARREST IN EQUITY ACTIONS
Introduction
An order of arrest is a provisional remedy which permits the
incarceration of a defendant as an incident to the prosecution of a
civil action. In equity actions, it is designed to insure a defendant's
presence in court where that is essential for the performance of some
act which the court may direct.' An irate student once wrote that
76For a recent article strongly criticizing the in rem procedure in New
York City, see Stein, "In Rem"-That Remarkable Remedy, BRONX REAL
ESTATE & BU.mDiNG NnwS (Oct. 1951).1N. Y. Civ. PEAc. AcT § 827.
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there is far more justice in placing at the disposal of creditors the use
of penal institutions to enforce the payment of a debt, than can be
ascribed to the arrest of a defendant before trial.2 While such an
impassioned statement may not be representative of judicial opinion,
it does characterize the dread with which many regard a remedy that
so limits personal liberty. Similar sentiments have not prevailed at
all times. In 1821 a New York Chancellor, in speaking of the writ
of ne exeat, for which an order of arrest is our modern substitute,
said: "Nor can it be truly said to be more dangerous to the liberty
of the citizen, than . . . any other proceeding by which the courts
. . . constrain men to act contrary to their will." 3 Twenty years
later, however, Chancellor Nicoll remarked: "When it is considered
that the ... writ of ne exeat, has not been effected by . . . the law
abolishing imprisonment for debt, it becomes a matter of no ordinary
interest to ascertain in what cases . . . this severe . . . remedy will
be allowed." 4 These contrasting views gave indications of a chang-
ing attitude. Indeed, the writ of ne exeat was abolished thereafter; r
and yet, it survives today with only a change in name to distinguish
it in most respects from the antique writ which originated centuries
ago. But regard for personal liberty has not been so static. Pro-
gressive concepts of individual freedom make it appear timely, there-
fore, to re-appraise arrest in equity actions.
History of the Ne Exeat
Under the ancient common law no power to restrain the person
was known to king or court. "[T] he Common Law . . . in the free-
dom of its spirit, allowed every man to depart the Realm at his own
pleasure." 6 The spectre of this powerful weapon made its first ap-
pearance in the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164. It was therein
decreed that ecclesiastics were not to depart the kingdom without a
license from the king.1 There is no doubt that such a drastic meas-
ure, directed as it was against a special group, was motivated by the
king's fear of the Papal See. Thereafter, to insure the obedience of
those subjects who still dared to defy the king, a second writ, directed
at laymen, was devised." Both writs have been referred to as the
Writ de securitate invenienda.9
2 See Note, 20 Ky. L. JouR. 478 (1932).
3 BEAmES, A BRIEF ViEw OF THE WRIT NE EXEAT REGNO 6 (1st Am. ed.,
Warner, 1821) (preface).
4 BEAMES, A BRIEF ViEw OF THE WRIT NE EXEAT REGNO (2d Am. ed.,
Nicoll, 1841) (preface).
5 N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS Acr § 23. Formerly N. Y. CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 548.6 BEAMEs, A BRIEF ViEw OF THE WRIT NE EXEAT REGNO 1 (1st ed.
1812).7 BL. COmm. *266.
8 Ibid. The writ was directed mainly at archers and soldiers as it was
feared that they might give aid to the enemy.
9 FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREv um 188, 193 (9th ed. 1793). There is a
Although the Magna Charta of King John reaffirmed the com-
mon law freedom of movement,1 ° and despite the absence of statu-
tory regulations, legal writers, by the time of Edward I (1239-1307),
were referring quite casually to the "king's license." Some justifi-
cation for the exercise of this royal prerogative is found in the com-
mon law duty of every man to defend the king.' In fact, the ap-
plication of the writ, at this time, was limited to affairs of state
wherein the safety of the kingdom was involved.' 2
In the reign of Richard II (1367-1400), a statute finally was
enacted conferring upon the king the right he had been freely exer-
cising for so many years.13 But whereas the former restraints were
based primarily upon political motives, the new act sought to control
the transfer of personal property out of the realm.14 The history of
this period, unfortunately, is enveloped in obscurity, and as a result,
the effect of the statute upon the writs is largely unknown. Despite
this shroud of uncertainty, however, it appears to have become set-
tled that ". . . no person whatever, let his rank or station be what
it might, . . . possessed a right of quitting the Realm, without the
king's license previously obtained." 1
What circumstances led to the disuse of the writ pertaining to
laymen remains unexplained. That fact, nevertheless, was true, and
produced an anomalous situation in that the writ which related to
the clergy was thereafter considered the prototype of the writ ne
exeat regno.16 How it happened that this writ, of all the others,
should be the one to prevent debtors from escaping their creditors is
a matter of conjecture. Beames surmised that "[i]t can be no other-
wise accounted for, than by its previously existing as a prohibitory
process, and being found admirably adapted to that end." 17  The
same thought was registered in Lord Eldon's comment that "[t]he
application of this high prerogative writ to these purposes can only
be justified by usage and practice." 18
The office of the writ of ne exeat was to secure a defendant's
presence in court, either by detaining him or by causing him to give
security, where that was essential for the effective performance of a
certain resemblance between the two writs, but it was never accurate to treat
them as one and the same identical writ. See BEA s, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 14.
1o BEAmEs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 4n.
13 10 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 390 (1931).
22 BL. COmm. *266.
'1 5 RcH. II, c. 2, § 2 (1381). The statute is said to have forbade "... all
persons whatever to go abroad without license except only the lords and other
great men of the realm, and true and notable merchants, and the kings
soldiers." BL. Comm. *266.
14 BEm.ES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8.
15 Ibid.
16 See Read v. Read, 1 Ch. 115, 22 Eng. Rep. 721, 722 (Ch. 1668).
17 BEAMES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
'
8 Etches v. Lance, 7 Ves. Jr. 417, '32 Eng. Rep. 169 (Ch. 1802).
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duty personal to the defendant. Although resort to the writ as a
civil remedy was gradual, its use as a means of enforcing private
rights had become established as early as the reign of Queen
Elizabeth.
Deterred by the unfavorable political origin of the writ, the
English courts exhibited a pronounced reluctance to extend its ap-
plication at the expense of personal liberty. Meticulous adherence
was shown, therefore, to the rule that ne exeats will issue only for
the enforcement of equitable,19 liquidated, pecuniary20 demands,
which were presently payable.21 The same law was adopted in New
York.2 2
To this rather arbitrary rule, however, two exceptions were
recognized. In the case where alimony had been decreed, the Eng-
lish courts granted the writ where it appeared that the husband con-
templated leaving the jurisdiction to evade future payments. 23 The
inability of the ecclesiastical courts to enforce alimony decrees has
been advanced as a justification for allowing the writ in this in-
stance.24 The exception, nevertheless, was not engrafted without
some misgiving.2 5 In New York, the exception was given a more
enthusiastic reception. In Denton v. Denton,20 for example, Chan-
cellor Kent granted the writ before alimony had even been decreed,
thus extending the English alimony exception to suits for sums not
yet ascertained. Although this case is still followed in New York,27
the English authorities clearly did not support such a doctrine.28
19 Jackson v. Petrie, 10 Ves. Jr. 164, 32 Eng. Rep. 807 (Ch. 1804) ; Atkin-
son v. Leonard, 3 Bro. 218, 29 Eng. Rep. 491 (Ch. 1791) ; Ex parte Bruncker,
3 P. Wins. 312, 24 Eng. Rep. 1079 (Ch. 1734).
20 Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Bro. 370, 29 Eng. Rep. 539 (Ch 1791) ; Rico v.
Gualtier, 3 Atk. 501, 26 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1747).
21 De Carriera v. De Calonne, 4 Ves. Jr. 578, 31 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1799);
cf. Dawson v. Dawson, 7 Ves. Jr. 173, 32 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1803).22 The writ issues only for equitable demands. Brownell v. Akin, 6 Hun
378 (N. Y.), appeal dismissed, 66 N. Y. 617 (1876); Palmer v. Van Doren,
2 Edw. Ch. 425 (N. Y. 1834). The demand must be pecuniary. Cowdin v.
Cram, 3 Edw. Ch. 231 (N. Y. 1837). The debt must be a sum certain and
due. Allen v. Hyde, 2 Abb. N. C. 197 (N. Y. 1876); Seymour v. Seymour,
1 Johns. Ch. 1 (N. Y. 1814).23 Haffey v. Haffey, 14 Ves. Jr. 261, 33 Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1807) ; Dawson
v. Dawson, 7 Ves. Jr. 173, 32 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1803); Shaftoe v. Shaftoe,
7 Ves. Jr. 172, 32 Eng. Rep. 70 (Ch. 1802).
24 Read v. Read, 1 Ch. 115, 22 Eng. Rep. 721 (Ch. 1668) ; Sir Jerom Smith-
son's Case, 2 Vent. 345, 86 Eng. Rep. 477 (Ch. 1679).
25 "It was a very strong thing to apply this writ to alimony: but it has
been done." Dawson v. Dawson, 7 Ves. Jr. 173, 32 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1803).
26 1 Johns. Ch. 364 (N. Y. 1815); accord, Forrest v. Forrest, 10 Barb.
46 (N. Y. 1850).
27 Schnabel v. Schnabel, 179 Misc. 620, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
McPartland v. McPartland, 146 Misc. 674, 261 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct.
1932).
28 See note 24 supra.
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The second exception arose in actions for an account wherein
the debtor admitted a balance due the creditor but disputed the
amount owed thereon.29  This latter case represented an example of
equity's exercise of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law.
Although the writ was allowed here, it formed an exception to the
general rule that the relief obtainable must be within the exclusive
cognizance of equity. Similarly, a ne exeat issued against a vendee
to compel the specific performance of a contract to purchase land,3 0
despite the availability to the vendor of a somewhat similar remedy
at law. Conversely, a demand by the vendee for specific performance
was not a money demand, and therefore not a case for ne exeat.31
As previously mentioned, the writ ne exeat regno was founded
upon the supposed prerogative of the king to restrain his own sub-
jects from departing the realm. Strictly speaking, it would seem
that it could not issue to prevent foreigners from quitting the king-
dom.3 2  This principle was initially applied by Lord Hardwicke 33
who thought that the parties should seek to have justice done where
they resided.84 But where it appeared that the parties were residents
of different countries having different laws, this reasoning was not
applicable, and the writ was allowed. 85 The theory of these early
cases was ultimately rejected however.3 6 The decision in De Carriera
v. De Calonne 3 apparently established the precedent for issuing the
writ against a foreigner at the suit of another nonresident, although
it was therein said: "It is very delicate to interfere as against for-
eigners .... by an application of the writ to them." 38 Lord Eldon,
nevertheless, tenaciously clung to his opinion that the writ should
not issue where the plaintiff resides out of the jurisdiction,3 9 despite
his prior admission that "I was bound by decision." 40 While the
later cases leave no doubt that the writ would issue against for-
eigners,41 these early decisions exemplify the refinements by which
29 Jones v. Sampson, 8 Ves. Jr. 593, 32 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch. 1803).
3 0 Boehm v. Wood, 1 Turn & Russ. 332, 37 Eng. Rep. 1128 (Ch. 1823);
Brown v. Haft, 5 Paige Ch. 235 (N. Y. 1835).31 Blaydes v. Calvert, 2 J. & W. 212, 37 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch. 1820) ; Cowdin
v. Cram, 3 Edw. Ch. 231 (N. Y. 1837).3 2 BFA ES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 44.
33 Pearne v. Lisle, 1 Amb. 76, 27 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1747).
34 Cf. Robertson v. Wilkie, 1 Amb. 177, 27 Eng. Rep. 119 (Ch. 1753).
35 Ibid.3 6 Flaek v. Holm, I J. & W. 406, 37 Eng. Rep. 430 (Ch. 1820); Stewart
v. Graham, 19 Ves. Jr. 313, 34 Eng. Rep. 533 (Ch. 1815) ; Howden v. Rogers,
1 Ves. & Bea. 129, 35 Eng. Rep. 51 (Ch. 1812).
3 4 Ves. Jr. 578, 31 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1799) (although the writ was
ultimately discharged it was not for this reason).38 Id. at 591, 31 Eng. Rep. at 303.
39 See Hyde v. Whitfield, 19 Ves. Jr. 341, 344, 34 Eng. Rep. 544, 545 (Ch.
1815).
40 Stewart v. Graham, 19 Ves. Jr. 313, 315, 34 Eng. Rep. 533, 534 (Ch.
1815).
41 See note 36 supra.
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the chancellors sought to justify an apparent extension of the writ.
As an additional safeguard, moreover, the English courts adopted the
salutary practice of discharging the writ where the defendant gave
security to abide by the decree.
42
Early New York Use of the Ne Exeat
Unfettered by the ominous political environment which sur-
rounded the growth of the writ in England, the New York courts
were unaffected by the subtle niceties to which the English Chan-
cellors had become so sensitized. The English idea that the writ of
ne exeat was a prerogative writ was held inapplicable here. To the
contrary, a ne exeat was considered as any ordinary process in equity.
When a proper case was presented, it had to be granted.43 The mere
fact of the parties' nonresidency, therefore, offered no obstacle to the
writ's issuance if the cause otherwise had sufficient equity.4 4 Not-
withstanding, the English practice of discharging the writ when the
defendant posted security was imitated.45
The tolerance with which the New York courts viewed imprison-
ment as an incidence to civil action was severely modified by the
passage of the Stilwell Act of 1831 abolishing imprisonment for
debt.46 Commensurate with the enlightened purpose of this legis-
lative enactment, the judiciary undertook to scrutinize more minutely
those processes which tended to restrain personal liberty. So strong,
in fact, was the belief that the Stilwell Act abolished the writ, that
the courts were constrained to emphasize the contrary.47 The Act,
nonetheless, achieved a notable result in that it provided a check on
the unreserved issuance of the writ. The admonition voiced in Pratt
v. Wells,48 that the writ of ne exeat is in the discretion of the court
and should always be granted with extreme caution, characterized
the prospectus entertained by a more beneficent judiciary. The prac-
42 Atkinson v. Leonard, 3 Bro. 218, 29 Eng. Rep. 499 (Ch. 1791); accord,
Flack v. Iohn, 1 J. & W. 406, 37 Eng. Rep. 430 (Ch. 1820); Howden v.
Rogers, 1 Ves. & Bea. 129, 35 Eng. Rep. 51 (Ch. 1812).
43 Cf. Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. 606, 617 (N. Y. 1831); Gilbert v.
Colt, 1 Hopk. Ch. 496, 500 (N. Y. 1825).
44Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. 606 (N. Y. 1831); see Woodward v.
Schatzell, 3 Johns. Ch. 412, 413 (N. Y. 1818).
45 Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. 606 (N. Y. 1831); see Gleason v. Bisby,
1 Clarke Ch. 551, 557 (N. Y. 1841).
46 Laws of N. Y. 1831, c. 300, § 1.
47 Cf. McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige Ch. 239, 241 (N. Y. 1838) ; Brown v.
Haff, 5 Paige Ch. 235, 239 (N. Y. 1835). But cf. Gleason v. Bisby 1 Clarke
Ch. 551, 558-559 (N. Y. 1841). "It is true, . . . that this Act does not affect
the power of the court to issue a ne exeat in any case of equitable cogni-
zance .... But I apprehend they will confine its exercise to cases where they
can. 1 .enforce their decrees . . . by attachment or execution."
48 1 Barb. 425, 426 (N. Y. 1847).
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lice of such judicial self-restraint was not universally followed.49
The more immediate consequence of the Stilwell Act, therefore, was
to point up sharply the existing difference of opinion as to whether
the writ issued of right or as a matter of discretion.
With the passage of the New York Code of Procedure in 1848
a more direct attack was launched to abrogate the writ.50 Section 153
of the Code expressly provided that "... . no person shall be arrested
in a civil action except as prescribed by this act." r1 It would seem
that the legislature, by so providing, actually intended to abolish the
writ; indeed, the Superior Court of New York City consistently held
that the writ no longer existed.52 The Supreme Court of the State,
however, was just as insistent in allowing the writ to issue.5 3
The question of the status of the writ was still open when the
New York Code of Civil Procedure was drawn in 1877.54 To dispel
all doubts the new statute stated unequivocally: "The writ of ne
exeat is hereby abolished." '5 Yet it was not the object of the legis-
lature to abrogate civil arrests in equity actions, and Sections 550
(subd. 4) and 551 were therefor enacted as a substitute for the writ.50
Today, those sections are included in and comprise Section 827 of
the Civil Practice Act.57
In his explanatory notes to the Code, Montgomery Throop pro-
vides an interesting insight into the legislative intent behind the en-
actment of these sections. After studying the divergent opinions and
practices in the state as to whether an order of arrest was a matter
of discretion or right, the commission undertook to settle the question
by rendering it a matter of right. 8 Accordingly, a provision was
inserted to the effect that an order be granted in a proper case-59 The
discretionary power of the court to fix bail was deemed sufficient to
prevent frivolous applications for an arrest. The legislature dis-
49 See note 47 supra.
50 Laws of N. Y. 1848, c. 379, § 153.
51 N. Y. CODE OF Crv. PRoc. § 153.
52 Johnston v. Johnston, 16 Abb. Pr. 43 (N. Y. 1863); Fuller v. Emeric,
2 Sandf. Ch. 626 (N. Y. 1849); cf. Fellows v. Heermans, 13 Abb. N. S. 1, 6(N. Y. 1870).
53 Bushnell v. Bushnell, 7 How. Pr. 389 (N. Y. 1853) ; Forrest v. Forrest,
10 Barb. 46 (N. Y. 1852); cf. Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 24, 25 (1880)
("These provisions [laws of 1877] impliedly concede that the writ had not
been abolished previously.").54 Laws of N. Y. 1877, c. 422, § 3.
55 N. Y. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 548.
56 THROOP, EXPLANATORY NoTEs ON THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 238
(1877).
5 Prior to the amendment of the Code made by the Laws of N. Y. 1886,
c. 672, § 1, there were, under § 550 of the Code, which corresponds with the
Civil Practice Act § 827, a number of actions at law under which an arrest
might be obtained. These were transferred by the amendment of that year
to § 549 of the Code, which corresponds with § 826 of the Civil Practice Act.
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approved, however, for it substituted the word "nay" for the com-
mission's "must" and thereby removed all doubts as to public policy
pertaining to an order of arrest. It was thought that this doctrine
was more in accordance with the temper of the profession and the
public.6 0
Current Use in New York
The provisions embodied in statutory form in 1877 are sub-
stantially the derivatives of those elements required for the issuance
of the common law writ of ne exeat.61 Section 827 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act authorizes an arrest whenever a defendant's departure from
the state would render ineffective an order of the court that the de-
fendant perform some act, provided however, that disobedience to
the order would be punishable as a contempt. The order is depen-
dent upon proof that the defendant is either a nonresident or a resi-
dent about to leave the state, and that by reason of such nonresidency
or prospective departure, there is danger that the judgment will be
rendered ineffectual. The order can be granted only by the court,
and lies solely within its discretion. Where an order of arrest is
available, the defendant may be held in custody, before or after judg-
ment, unless he procures bail.6 2 The filing of a bail bond, however,
in no sense secures the payment of any judgment that may be ren-
dered. It simply provides that the defendant shall render himself
amenable to proceedings to punish him for disobedience of the court's
mandate.6
3
An order of arrest can be granted only where the existence of a
cause of action and facts sufficient to authorize the order are shown
to the satisfaction of the court.6 4  It is, then, the office of the affi-
davits to present the evidence to the court from which it, and not the
affiant, is to draw the inferences and conclusions.6 5 The affiant should
state the specific and particular facts essential to his action.6 6 Affi-
davits based upon allegations of information and belief without iden-
tifying the source thereof are insufficient.6 7  Mere allegations that
60 THRoop, op. cit. .rnpra note 60, at 238.
61 The statute is a substitute for the writ of ne exeat. See Muffatt v.
Fulton, 132 N. Y. 507, 514, 30 N. E. 992, 994 (1892); Boucicault v. Bouci-
cault, 21 Hun 431, 435 (N. Y. 1880).
2 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 847.
6s N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 849.
64 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 833.
65 Plotnick v. Plotnick, 185 App. Div. 15, 172 N. Y. Supp. 584 (lst Dep't
1918); Thompson v. Best, 4 N. Y. Supp. 229 (1st Dep't 1889); Dreyfus v.
Otis, 54 How. Pr. 405 (N. Y. 1877).6 6 Markey v. Diamond, 19 N. Y. Supp. 181 (N. Y. City Ct. 1892), aff'd,
1 Misc. 972, 20 N. Y. Supp. 847 (C. P. 1893) ; De Weerth v. Feldner, 16 Abb.
Pr. 295 (N. Y. 1863); Whitlock v. Roth, 5 How. Pr. 143 (N. Y. 1863).
67 Boyle v. Semenoff, 201 App. Div. 426, 194 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't
1922); Banque Agricoli of Roumania v. Ungureanu, 53 App. Div. 254, 65
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the defendant intends to leave the jurisdiction likewise are not suffi-
cient of themselves. It must clearly appear that the plaintiff will be
prejudiced thereby. 68 In the usual case the application for an order
of arrest is made ex parte. However, when made on notice, and
when conflicting affidavits are equally creditable, the court will refuse
the order, for justice is not done by placing the burden on the defen-
dant. 69 Since the court, in effect, must study the facts and prognos-
ticate the final result in advance of trial, it must be judicially satisfied.
The order, if signed by the court, is delivered to the sheriff who
executes it by arresting the defendant. Failure of the sheriff to serve
upon the defendant a copy of the order nullifies the arrest, however,
for it is only by reference to the affidavits that the defendant can
ascertain the reason for his detention. 70 The defendant may obtain
his release at any time by posting bail,71 or he may, within twenty
days from the arrest, make a motion to vacate the order or to reduce
the amount of the bail.72
At present, an order of arrest under Section 827 is applied for
in relatively restricted instances. It is most frequently requested in
actions for an accounting 73 and for alimony.74 The order is also
available in actions for specific performance of a contract, 5 and, in an
unusual case, it was allowed in an action for damages and an in-
junction for breach of an employment contract.76 Even in these in-
stances, the courts have given themselves a wide berth in which to
exercise their discretion. A recent case on arrest serves to illustrate
the present attitude of the courts on the matter.
N. Y. Supp. 892 (1st Dep't 1900) ; Ammon v. Kellar, 21 Misc. 442, 47 N. Y.
Supp. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
68 N. Y. Civ. PaAc, Acr § 827; Stroub v. Henly, 1 How. Pr. N. S. 400
(N. Y. 1885); De Rivafinola v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 265 (N. Y. 1883).
69 Burns v. Newman, 274 App. Div. 301, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 285 (1st Dep't
1948); Levy v. Bernhard, 2 App. Div. 336, 37 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1st Dep't
1896); cf. Corwin v. Freeland, 6 N. Y. 560 (1852). See also 62 HARV. L.
Rav. 689 (1949). But see McClure v. Levy, 22 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (1st Dep't
1893); Frost v. M'Carger, 14 How. Pr. 131 (N. Y. 1857).
70 Klenoff v. Goodstein, 268 App. Div. 510, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 919 (1st Dep't
1944) ; cf. Van Den Bos v. Van Den Bos, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
72 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 847.72 RuLvs OF Civ. PRAc. Rule 83.
73 Ensign v. Nelson, 1 N. Y. Supp. 685 (1st Dep't 1888), aff'd nern., 112
N. Y. 674, 20 N. E. 416 (1889); Klenoff v. Goodstein, 268 App. Div. 510, 51
N. Y. S. 2d 919 (1st Dep't 1944); Montgomery v. Shear, 182 App. Div. 238,
169 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1st Dep't 1918).
74 Matter of Kaufman, 272 App. Div. 323, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't
1947), arff'd mem., 297 N. Y. 814, 78 N. E. 2d 611 (1948); Schnabel v.
Schnabel, 179 Misc. 620, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; McPartland v.
McPartland, 146 Misc. 674, 261 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Sturges
v. Sturges, 114 Misc. 475, 186 N. Y. Supp. 693 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
75 Gordon v. Fox, 11 N. Y. Supp. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
76 General Explosive Co. v. Hough, 63 Misc. 337, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1114(Sup. Ct. 1909).
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Recent Application
In Bata v. Bata an order of arrest had been granted to compel a
nonresident defendant to account for and deliver to the plaintiffs,
also nonresidents, the indices of ownership in companies located in
twenty-seven different countries. It appeared that the cause of ac-
tion arose seventeen years before in Czechoslovakia, and that the de-
fendant had few assets within the state. The Appellate Division77
vacated the order on the basis that the affidavits did not warrant de-
taining the defendant to guarantee performance by him of any judg-
ment with respect to his assets which were primarily in other coun-
tries, especially when such a judgment ordinarily would be effectuated
only through principles of comity. This determination has been
criticized. 8
It is well settled that an order of arrest will issue for any cause
arising outside this state whenever the case is otherwise a proper one
in which to grant the order.79 The circumstance of the parties' non-
residence does not change the rule,80 and it prevails although an arrest
may not have been available in the jurisdiction where the parties
resided.' There are instances, however, where doubt has been ex-
pressed as to the propriety of granting the order under these circum-
stances.82  In Hyers v. Ayers 8 the court discharged an order of
arrest and forewarned that "[w]here a nonresident comes into this
jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecuting a nonresident, under cir-
cumstances seemingly oppressive, or indicating a desire to . . . sub-
ject him to unusual inconveniences, the court will scrutinize the case
more closely . . ,, 84 Somewhat more emphatic was the assertion
of the court in Boyle v. Semenoff wherein it was said: "Were it not
for the fact that the defendant . . . thus happened to be passing
through the country, plaintiff would be obliged to rely for any redress
"277 App. Div. 335, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 191 (1st Dep't 1950), appeal dis-
missed, 302 N. Y. 213, 97 N. E. 2d 757 (1951). No appeal lies from an order
vacating an arrest. The granting of the order is discretionary and the exer-
cise of such discretion is not the- subject of review. Clarke v. Lourie, 82
N. Y. 580 (1880); Liddell v. Paton, 67 N. Y. 393 (1876).
7851 COL. L. REv. 394 (1951).
79 Johnson v. Whitman, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 111 (N. Y. 1871); Yates v.
Blodgett, 8 How. Pr. 278 (N. Y. 1853); McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige Ch.
239 (N. Y. 1838).
80 Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. 606 (N. Y. 1831); see Woodward v.
Schatzell, 3 Johns. Ch. 412, 413 (N. Y. 1818).8 1 Stern v. Schlessinger, 5 N. Y. Supp. 1 (City Ct. 1889); City Bank v.
Lumley, 28 How. Pr. 397 (N. Y. 1865); Smith v. Spinola, 2 Johns. Ch. 198
(N. Y. 1807).
82 "Whether it would not be a better exercise of discretion to refuse to
grant the order of arrest in an action between parties residing in the same,
but not in this State, is a subject upon which judges may differ." Johnson v.
Whitman, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 111, 114 (N. Y. 1871).
83 2 E. D. Smith 211 (N. Y. 1841).84Id. at 215.
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... upon the courts . . . where the alleged conversion took place." 85
Surely no one can disagree that an order of arrest ought not be
made an instrument of harassment and annoyance. Righteous dif-
ference of opinion may arise, however, where a concept, such as op-
pression, must be measured by degrees of circumstance. Justice,
nevertheless, precludes any determination not predicated upon a com-
mon sense appraisal of the particular merits of each case wherein
each individual factor is evaluated in its contextual relationship to
the whole. Clearly, the prospects of there being a judgment of
doubtful efficacy, such as there existed in the Bata case, is not a cir-
cumstance which alone will justify an order 6f arrest, particularly
if consideration ought to be given to the defendant's liberty. Even
historically the plaintiff was without authority, for, while ne exeats
had been granted where there was danger that a defendant would ab-
scond with the assets, 6 no authority appears to sustain their issuance
in actions involving nonresident parties in the absence of property
within the jurisdiction.8 7 To be sure, equity has jurisdiction to act
whenever the parties are before the court, but "[i] t is a power which
in the interest of comity must be sparingly exercised." 88
In addition to this question of jurisdiction, the Court was pre-
sented not only with conflicting affidavits but also with affidavits of
doubtful efficacy. It has been said: "A clear case for arrest should
be established . . . and especially should this be so where the appli-
cation is made after years of delay. . . ,, 8' In the Bata case, the
allegations were based on a course of conduct which occurred seven-
teen years before in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, while the plain-
tiffs alleged a conversion, the defendant directly countered with a
purported transfer of title. The onus of dispelling, by a preponder-
ance of proof, the doubt which thereupon arose was upon the plain-
tiffs. This they failed to do. Certainly, the passage of time, the
distance of the situs, and the intervening world conflict were not cir-
cumstances which aided the plaintiffs in marshalling facts which
85 201 App. Div. 426, 431, 194 N_. Y. Supp. 309, 314 (1st Dep't 1918).
86sBaker v. Dumaresque, 2 Atk. 67, 26 Eng. Rep. 438 (Ch. 1740); Mc-
Namara v. Dvyer, 7 Paige Ch. 239 (N. Y. 1839).
87 In Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. 606, 608-611 (N. Y. 1831), the de-
fendant's counsel argued that there was no property within the jurisdiction of
our court. The counsel for plaintiff countered that it was not necessary in
these cases, but that the bill was so framed, as to compel a discovery of all
the defendant's property (arguments of counsel). Certainly, the bill as framed
does not justify citing the case as authority for the proposition that ne exeats
will issue in the absence of assets. In Smedberg v. Marks, 6 Johns. Ch. 138
(N. Y. 1822), the writ was discharged as the defendant did not appear to
possess any assets. Cf. 51 COL. L. REv. 394, 395 (1951).
88 Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids & Ionia R. R., 246 N. Y.
194, 200, 158 N. E. 70, 73 (1927).
89 Griswold v. Sweet, 49 How. Pr. 171, 177 (N. Y. 1875) ; accord, Cormier
v. Hawkins, 69 N. Y. 188 (1877) ; Mulry v. Collett, 26 Super. Ct. 716 (N. Y.
1865).
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tended to inspire confidence in their veracity. All elements consid-
ered, a resolution of the doubt in favor of the defendant Bata could
hardly be considered to have been without the court's discretion.90
Comments
The infrequent resort to arrest in equity actions today is notice-
able in contrast to the comparatively more common recourse had to
arrest in actions at law. But whether at law or in equity, an order
of arrest is an awesome remedy, especially frightening to the poor
who are thereby punished for their poverty since inability to furnish
bail results in continued incarceration. 91 Moreover, rich and poor
alike suffer from the social stigma of civil imprisonment, for unfor-
tunately, the public generally does not realize the difference between
civil and criminal arrest. Then, too, this legal refinement offers little
comfort to the defendant who is as truly imprisoned as if arrested on
criminal process. Indeed, the accused in a criminal action, discount-
ing the preliminary incarceration, is jailed before trial only after he
has been informed of the charges against him, has been afforded an
opportunity to confront witnesses, and has been given the benefit of
counsel. In civil arrest, no such rights are accorded the defendant.9 2
No hearing is had. The first notice the defendant receives of the
charges against him is the appearance of the sheriff with the order
for his arrest. If unable to post bail, he is immediately imprisoned.
The defendant's only relief is to apply to the court, upon affidavits,
to vacate the order.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the judicially discreet have
sought the abolition of arrest in actions at law.95 No corresponding
appeals have been voiced concerning arrests in equity actions.94
While many factors relevant to both actions are substantially simi-
lar,95 there is a basic difference. The right to an order of arrest in
90 Burns v. Newman, 274 App. Div. 201, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 285 (1st Dep't
1948) ; McPartland v. McPartland, 146 Misc. 674, 261 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup.
Ct. 1932); Flour City Nat. Bank v. Hall, 33 How. Pr. 1 (N. Y. 1862).91 See discussion in 28 REP.' OF N. Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 151, 169 (1905).92 See 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF STATE OF N. Y. 337, 342 (1946);
28 REP. OF N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 151, 172 (1905).
93 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF STATE OF N. Y. 337 (1946) ; Medina, Shall
New York Surrender Leadership in Procedural Reform, 29 COL. L. REv. 158(1929); PRASHxER, N. Y. PRACTICE §355 (2d ed. 1951). The recommenda-
tion of the Judicial Council was tabled in 14 REP. JUDIcIAL COUNCIL OF STATE
OF N. Y. 174 (1948). For a criticism of the motion tabling the proposal, see
Note, 26 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rsv. 172 (1951); Note, 12 ALB. L. REv. 17 (1948).94 The proposed abolition of the order of arrest in actions at law would not
affect arrests in equity actions. PRASHcER, N. Y. PRACrCE § 355 (2d ed.
1951).
95 The competency of the proof submitted in affidavits is the same as when
made under Section 826. 7 CARmODY, N. Y. PRACTICE §85 (2d ed. 1932).
An order of arrest in equity actions takes the same form as an order in ac-
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law actions generally depends upon the nature of the action.9 To
obtain the order the affiant need only allege a proper cause of action;
whereas, in equity actions, the extrinsic fact of the defendant's non-
residency or pending departure must be shown.97  While arrests in
actions at law also are discretionary, 98 this has not been deemed a
satisfactory safeguard. Failure of the judge to inquire into the
veracity of affidavits has been thought to render faith in the discre-
tion of the court a mere substitute for reliance upon the mythical
universally honest plaintiff.99 That criticism is not equally applicable
to equity actions. Proof of the existence of the extrinsic facts ap-
pears to provide the protection necessary to supplant any failings in
the discretionary power of the court. The wisdom of a statute which
leaves to the court an area in which to exercise its discretion, flexible
enough to provide bona fide petitioners with the redress permitted by
law, and yet at the same time, staunch enough to uphold justice,
would seem to be unquestionable. Its lawful use should be spared
for the exceptional case which demands its application.
X
TORT LIABILITY OF THE TRUST ESTATE: TOwARD DIRECT RECOVERY
The Problem
Recently, because of a negligent act, a man lost the tip of his
nose. The negligence was committed by an employee of an executor
of a decedent's estate. Several persons were sued for damages but,
upon final adjudication of the action, only one person was held liable,
namely, the faultless executor in his individual capacity., One of the
intermediate courts, which heard the case, commented as follows:
"This is a strange case. The real owner of the business in which the
accident occurred, the estate, was never brought in as a party to the
action. The real negligent party ... has been absolved.... [T]he
executor . . .who was admitedly not personally negligent has been
made solely responsible merely because he happened to be one of the
tions at law except that in equity actions the order can be granted only by
the court. PRASHxER, N. Y. PRACnCE § 343 (2d ed. 1951).
06 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 826.97 N. Y. Civ. PR~c. ACT § 827.98 Frank v. Tuthill, 241 App. Div. 720, 270 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1st Dep't
1934); Gelles v. Rosenbaum, 141 Misc. 588, 252 N. Y. Supp. 827 (Sup. Ct.
1931).
99 See 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF STAT OF N. Y. 337, 342 (1946);
Note, 12 ALB. L. REv. 17, 37 (1948). The failure of the judiciary properly
to perform its function hardly can be ascribed as a defect in the statute.
"Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P. 2d 645 (1947).
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